its objectivity upon the very same practices actors in general mobilize in the recognition of their everyday worlds; ethnomethodology focuses on those practices. Michael Lynch drives this point home in a chapter on measurement. Since measurement is produced from within the very society being measured, then it ought properly to be examined as a local achievement. Here again is the emphasis upon endogenous, as opposed to exogenous, material. In another historical sketch, Coulter makes the same point about cognition and the reliance of artificial intelligence experts on exogenous cognitive processes, which necessarily overlook the empirical detail of cognition as it naturally occurs. John R. E. Lee makes similar points about the way linguists and anthropologists traditionally approach the relationship between language and culture, whatever their commitments in the controversy. And Lena Jayyusi, in a particularly interesting semihistorical review, extends the general argument to how moral philosophers have approached questions of value and moral judgment. Jayyusi closes with some extremely provocative questions about whether ethnomethodological respecification necessarily removes ethnomethodologists from political pragmatics or whether, as Jayyusi seems to think, it necessarily involves them in such pragmatics. This derivative issue begs for further exploration and should perhaps be the topic of a separate volume.

Finally, this book includes an updated version of an important statement by Harold Garfinkel, based on his talk at the 1987 American Sociological Association meetings and published previously in the newsletter of the Discourse and Analysis Research Group and in Sociological Theory. In it he expresses his indebtedness to Talcott Parsons and discusses the origins of ethnomethodological respecification in reconstructive readings of The Structure of Social Action.

These essays furnish much to think about. Most of the points have been well argued before, but these authors trace the contours of the arguments in greater detail and extend them to realms previously unaddressed. The book would work well in seminars in ethnomethodology, theory, or even methods, particularly in combination with ethnomethodological studies published elsewhere for an examination of how or whether the studies manifest points made by these authors.


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Mugny and Perez's book is undoubtedly a long overdue addition to the literature on social influence. The book is an outgrowth of about a decade and a half of developmental research on minority influence by the authors and by Serge Moscovici. Hence, it documents the potency and process of minority-group status influence. The book may be conceived as a departure from the dominant, but unidirectional, emphasis of traditional studies on majority influence, with their constituents, uniformity (adaptation), and obedience (internalization). The reciprocal effect of minority on majority, with the associated issues of innovation and social change, is the underlying theme of this book.

The six substantive chapters (a seventh gives details on instrumentation and procedures) provide a coherent, systematic, and rather rich combination of the historic contexts, theoretical rationale, and empirical validation of the themes and subthemes of the study. The process of minority influence, from initial disapproval from the majority to insidious social change, is skillfully developed, and the theoretical model is placed within the tradition of intergroup processes, in particular, those pertaining to social identity and social differentiation.

The authors provided adequate theoretical grounding for their model by demonstrating that minority influence becomes either salient or ineffective through previously understood processes associated with in-group and out-group categorization. They then specify the conditions and mechanisms through which minority group influence becomes indirectly and latently effective. The authors use a cognitive model of reconstruction, redefinition, and reanalysis to illustrate and clarify the change pathways associated with minority influence—their "model of validation." While the processes outlined are not altogether new to cognitive or motivational social psychological studies, the authors' applications of them to an understanding of the process of minority influence are certainly innovative and commendable.
Another theme of the book is the integration of the model of validation with the processes of social comparison which the authors represent as underlying direct social influences, as opposed to the latent influences associated with the former model. This is perhaps the most challenging undertaking of the study. But through the combination of a logical articulation of social comparison and empirical documentation, the authors are able to extend their validation model to include social comparison, which is recognized as underlying all forms of social influence.

The final theme of the book is a consideration of the role of resistance to minority influence. This follows logically, since the central thesis is that minority influence is made effective because of the conflict it induces, which in turn leads to the cognitive activities associated with the model of validation. Accordingly, the authors are not concerned with minority effects associated with the temporal and normative salience of the issues, but rather with change in the face of majority resistance. Their basic conclusion is that resistance, because of the social salience it provides to the minority position, can be a catalyst for social change, though often in “new attitude domains” (p. 162).

Throughout their book, Mugny and Perez employ several experimental studies to test their hypotheses and to support their assumptions. These studies were scientifically designed and their findings carefully interpreted. The book therefore represents one of the more careful studies that lend credence to the value of experimental research in social psychology. Overall, then, *The Social Psychology of Minority Influence* is an important addition to the study of social influence and concisely captures a distinctive line of minority research by European social psychologists. In my opinion, the book is a must for advanced students and scholars of social influence, conformity, or attitudes.


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At the core of Radley’s argument is an insight fundamental to the study of the body. “One is not attending to the body,” he writes, “so much as attending from it” (p. 183). We do not need more mentions of the body as a topic, but rather we need to rethink social science, with the body as its ground; not the study of bodies as objects, but rather self-consciousness of attending to the social world from a stance of embodiment.

This commitment to an embodied stance creates editorial problems. Radley is explicit that he does not seek “to put forward a theory of the body or a framework for an embodied psychology” (p. 177). The problem is how he can organize what he does have to say in the absence of a theory or framework. I agree with his commitment but have reservations about the text he leaves us. *The Body in Social Psychology* makes useful observations both about how social science has advanced our understanding of the body and about how the social psychological denial of embodiment has marred many studies. Unfortunately these observations are scattered.

Radley takes on at least two tasks. One is to critique social psychology for its inattention to the body. When bodies are mentioned, they are understood as “repositories of emotion,” or as “the generalization of the universal subject as male, rational, individual, and healthy,” or as “a rather ornate signaling system” within “the logocentrism of psychology” (pp. 187–88). The last disposition of the body is particularly apparent in studies of nonverbal communication, and Radley’s critique of these is his most incisive.

Radley’s second task is constructive. Here he turns to a variety of non–social psychological studies to consider what an embodied social science might be. He finds the most interesting ideas in Elias, Mary Douglas, Goffman, Foucault, and Bourdieu, which should not surprise sociologists. We can feel some in-group self-satisfaction when Radley comes to the conclusion that “the psychological body . . . enters the discipline through the door marked ‘social’” (p. 186).

Unfortunately the first task is not interesting enough to compensate for its distractions from the second. The critique of social psychology suffers for lack of any bounded notion of what that “area” is. Radley does not even identify which of the many studies